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Abstract
Each year since 2018, more than 10,000 UK firms have been required to publicly disclose
their gender pay gap and gender composition. This paper studies how this transparency policy
affects the occupational outcomes and wages of male and female workers. Theoretically, pay
transparency represents an information shock that alters the bargaining power of male and
female employees vis--vis the firm in an asymmetric way. As women are currently underpaid,
this shock may improve women’s relative outcomes. We test these theoretical predictions using
a difference-in-difference strategy that exploits the variation in the UK mandate across firm
size and time. Our results show that pay transparency increases the probability that women
are hired in above-median-wage occupations by 5 percent compared to the pre-policy mean.
Additionally, it leads to a 2.8 percent decrease in male real hourly pay in treated firms compared
to control ones. Combining the difference-in-difference strategy with a text analysis of job
listings, we also find suggestive evidence that treated firms in industries with a high gender
pay gap become more likely to post wage information than firms in the control group.
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1 Introduction
The 4th of April 2018 was the first deadline for more than 10,000 UK firms to publish statistics
on their gender pay gaps. Up until that time, less than 3 percent of UK firms had ever publicly
disclosed this information (Downing et al. 2015). The following day, all national British newspa-
pers commented on the figures. The second deadline fell in April 2019, and again drew significant
media attention (Financial Times 2019, BBC 2018, The Guardian 2018, Financial Times 2018).1
While the UK is the only country in which some companies are required to publish their gender
pay gaps publicly, many countries are adopting pay transparency policies. All have the declared
objective of reducing the gender pay gap.2 The argument for these initiatives goes as follows: pay
transparency is an information shock that asymmetrically alters the bargaining power of male and
female employees vis--vis the firm because women are paid less than men on average (Cullen and
Perez-Truglia 2018b). Due to the potential negative effects of unequal pay on firm reputation, the
shock also incentivizes targeted firms to hire more women in better paid positions, and discourages
the promotion of male employees. In turn, this could translate into improved pay and occupational
outcomes for women relative to men.
This paper tests these theoretical predictions in the UK setting. The British government passed
the Equality Act 2010 (Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations 2017 in February 2017. The act
mandates that all firms registered in Great Britain with at least 250 employees have to publish, on
a dedicated government website, a series of indicators that include percentage mean and median
gender hourly pay differentials, and the share of women in each quartile of the wage distribution.
If a firm has at least 250 employees by the end of each financial year (April), it has to provide these
figures by the end of the following financial year. According to the government, all firms that were
required to comply with the law did so during its first two years of operation.
To identify the impact of this policy on wages and occupational outcomes of male and female
workers, we use a difference-in-difference strategy that exploits the variation across firm size and
over time in the application of the government mandate. To avoid capturing any potential impact
of this policy on firm size, we define the treatment status based on firms’ number of employees
prior to the introduction of the mandate. To enhance comparability, we restrict the sample to firms
with +/-50 employees from the 250 threshold.
To conduct this analysis, we use the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) from
2012 to 2019. This is an annual employer survey covering 1 percent of the UK workforce, and is
designed to be representative of the employee population. Crucially for us, it provides information
on gender, number of employees, firm and individual identifiers, wage components, hours worked,
tenure, occupation, and industry.
Our analysis delivers two key findings. First, the mandate changes the occupational compo-
sition of the pool of female employees in treated firms compared to control ones, by increasing
the probability that women work in above-median-wage occupations by 5 percent relative to the
pre-policy mean. As this effect comes from newly hired women, so far it has failed to translate
into a visible increase in women’s salaries. However, our second finding is that pay transparency
1In mid-March 2020, just two weeks before the publication deadline, the requirement to publish gender pay gap
data was temporarily paused due to the coronavirus outbreak. At that time, only half of firms had published their data
(Financial Times 2020).
2Following the recommendations of the European Commission, Denmark, Italy, France, and Germany introduced
transparency laws, for instance.
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leads to pay compression from above: the mandate leads to a 2.8 percent decrease in male real
hourly wages in treated firms relative to control ones following its introduction. In our preferred
specification, this effect is statistically different from the impact on women’s real hourly pay.3
A series of event study exercises show that these results do not capture pre-policy differential
trends in the outcomes of interest between treated and control groups. With additional robustness
checks, we exclude that our estimates capture the impact of time shocks affecting firms above and
below the 250 threshold differently. First, our estimates are unchanged in triple-difference regres-
sions that account for within-group time shocks common to male and female employees. Second,
difference-in-discontinuity specifications that control for firm-size specific time shocks deliver the
same results as our difference-in-difference model. Third, we estimate placebo regressions, pre-
tending that the policy binds at different firm size thresholds, and find no significant effect of
placebo policies. Finally, we check that our estimates are not sensitive to the choice of the esti-
mation sample around the 250 cutoff, and that they are robust to the year used to define treatment
status.
To delve into the mechanisms driving the estimated effects, and, in particular, in order to un-
derstand how treated firms may have been able to attract more women, we analyze their hiring
strategies. For this, we exploit a unique data set compiled by Burning Glass Technologies (BGT
hereafter) which collates online job listings from 2012 onward for the UK. We focus specifically
on wage posting decisions and the wording of job listings. Many studies document a gender gap
in bargaining skills in favor of men (Leibbrandt and List 2015, Bowles et al. 2007, Babcock et al.
2003). Despite this, in the BGT data less than 40 percent of vacancies contain automatically iden-
tifiable information on wages. A recent strand of papers from the psychological and management
literature also suggests that women are less likely to apply for jobs with male-oriented worded
postings - that is a vocabulary that is usually associated to men in implicit association tests (Tang
et al. 2017, Gaucher et al. 2011). In light of these stylized facts, we combine the difference-in-
difference strategy with a text analysis of job listings to test whether treated firms change wage
posting decisions and the wording of their job listings following the introduction of the pay trans-
parency policy. Our results suggest that firms belonging to industries with a high gender pay gap
are a third more likely to post wages relative to the pre-treatment period. As for the wording of job
listings’, while we find that firms with a male-oriented wording tend to publish a larger gender pay
gap, we fail to detect any significant impact of the policy on this margin of decision.
Finally, to provide a comprehensive picture on the impact of this policy on targeted firms, we
study the reaction of the stock market following the publication of gender pay gap indicators by
firms listed on the London Stock Exchange - representing around 10 percent of firms targeted by
the mandate and one third of the listed firms. This analysis indicates that, in the first year of the
mandate, firms’ cumulative abnormal returns decrease by around 35 basis points in the aftermath of
the publication. While this effect fades away after four days, it shows that firms publishing gender
pay gap indicators are subject to the scrutiny of investors. In turn, this suggests that a reputation
3Using ASHE, we also studied whether this policy affects employees’ retention rates. Recent evidence shows that
disclosing information on peers’ salaries may hurt job satisfaction and increase the job search intentions of low-paid
employees (Perez-Truglia 2020, Dube et al. 2019, Breza et al. 2018, Cullen and Perez-Truglia 2018a, Card et al. 2012).
In the UK, publishing gender pay gap indicators may discourage female employees, and be perceived as a threat by
male employees. As such, it could weaken employees’ satisfaction and increase quitting rates. At the same time,
if firms respond by promoting gender equality, a more egalitarian environment may increase employees’ retention.
Based on our estimates, at least in the short run, none of these two forces seem to prevail.
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motive could explain why firms reacted to the policy.
Overall, this paper provides several contributions to different strands of literature. First, it
adds to the growing number of studies from the economic and management literature analyzing
the impact of pay transparency policies on personnel management decisions and the gender pay
gap (Gulyas et al. 2020, Baker et al. 2019, Bennedsen et al. 2019, Burn and Kettler 2019, Mas
2017). The closest studies to ours are Gulyas et al. (2020), Baker et al. (2019), and Bennedsen et
al. (2019). Baker et al. (2019) studies the effect on the gender pay gap of a Canadian law imposing
that public sector organizations publish employees’ salaries above a certain pay threshold, while
Gulyas et al. (2020) and Bennedsen et al. (2019) analyze the impact on the gender pay gap of a 2011
Austrian law and a 2006 Danish law, respectively, mandating private firms to provide employees’
representative pay measures by gender and occupation. Both Baker et al. (2019) and Bennedsen
et al. (2019) find that transparency leads to pay compression from above, while Gulyas et al.
(2020) find no impact on individual wages and the gender pay gap. Relative to these studies, the
UK mandate has two unique features that could help us improve our understanding of the effects
of pay transparency. First, it requires the publication of the percentage gender pay gap, rather
than pay levels by gender. In the latter case, both male and female workers’ bargaining power
may increase as all employees acquire information on gender differentials, but also on one’s own
gender pay. In contrast, in the UK, this second channel is shut down. Second, the public disclosure
of the information, coupled with extensive media attention, magnifies the information shock and
stimulates behavioral responses. In addition to studying a unique setting, our paper also offers a
comprehensive analysis of the impact of the pay transparency policy, that includes its effects on
firms’ hiring strategies and the stock market.
Next, our text analysis of job listing data specifically contributes to the growing number of
papers from different fields studying the importance of implicit biases in job postings (Burn et al.
2019, Tang et al. 2017, Mikolov et al. 2013, Gaucher et al. 2011). In particular, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper that documents a correlation between firms’ hiring strategies and
the magnitude of firms’ gender pay gap. More broadly, this analysis will add to the increasing
strand of economics papers that use job advertisement data to study the dynamics of the labor
market, from the evolution of skill requirements to labor market concentration (Azar et al. 2019b,
Azar et al. 2018, Deming and Kahn 2018, Azar et al. 2019a).
Finally, our study contributes to the analysis of policies aimed at tackling the gender pay gap.
As policies such as gender quotas and paternity leave have been proven to have a negligible im-
pact so far, it seems especially important to assess the role of other interventions, including pay
transparency (Antecol et al. 2018, Wasserman 2019, Bertrand et al. 2019, Ekberg et al. 2013).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting and the UK trans-
parency policy. Section 3 discusses the identification strategy. Section 4 describes the data used in
the empirical analysis. Section 5 illustrates the main results. Section 6 reports the results of a bat-
tery of robustness checks. Section 7 discusses the potential mechanisms behind the main results,
focusing in particular on firms’ hiring strategies. Section 8 presents the stock market reaction.
Section 9 concludes.
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2 Institutional setting
In 2015, the UK government launched a process of consultations with employers to enhance pay
transparency. At that time, the average gender pay gap for all employees in the UK stood at 19.1
percent. Moreover, women made up only 34 percent of managers, directors, and senior officials
(Government Equalities Office 2015). According to the government’s view, “greater transparency
will encourage employers and employees to consider what more can be done to close any pay
gaps. Moreover, employers with a positive story to tell will attract the best talent” (Government
Equalities Office 2015).
In February 2017, this process resulted in the passing of the Equality Act 2010 (Gender Pay Gap
Information) Regulations 2017. This mandate imposes that all firms registered in Great Britain that
have at least 250 employees should publish gender pay gap indicators both on their own website
and on a dedicated website managed by the Government Equalities Office (GEO hereafter).4,5
The timing of publication works as follows: if a firm has at least 250 employees by the end of a
financial year (April), it has to provide gender pay indicators by the end of the following financial
year. Firms themselves must calculate their number of employees, using guidelines provided by
the government. Importantly, they have to adopt an extended definition of employee that includes
agency workers. Partners of firms are also included in the definition of employees, but should
not enter in the calculation of the indicators. Finally, part-time workers have the same weight as
full-time ones in the calculations.
The indicators that firms have to report include: the overall mean and median gender hourly
pay gap, expressed in percentage terms; the overall mean and median gender bonus gap; the pro-
portion of male and female employees who receive any bonus pay; and the proportion of male
and female employees in each quartile of the company wage distribution. Table 1 provides sam-
ple means of these indicators for the two years prior to 2020 that firms have had to publish them.
The mean gender pay gap is just below 15 percent and decreases by 1 percent between 2017/2018
and 2018/2019. The median gender gap is smaller in both years and slightly increases over time,
suggesting that the decrease in the mean gap is driven by a drop in extreme values. Both the mean
and the bonus gap are smaller but it is worth noting from the standard deviation that some firms
mistakenly reported the level gap rather than a percentage, making it difficult to interpret these
mean values.6 The share of women receiving bonus pay is smaller than that of men in both years,
and the ratio remains stable over time. The gender ratio along the wage distribution is balanced
at the bottom, but the share of women is smaller in the upper part of the distribution. Yet, this
4This legislation does not apply to Northern Ireland.
5The mandate applies to both private and public sector; however, the public sector was already subject to some
transparency measures. According to regulations introduced in 2011, public bodies in England with over 150 em-
ployees were required to publish information annually on the diversity of their workforce, though no gender pay gap
information. The Welsh regulations, also introduced in 2011, require public bodies to publish the number of men and
women employees broken down by pay level. Public authorities are also required to make arrangements for identi-
fying and collecting (but not necessarily publishing) information about differences between the pay of people with
protected characteristics such as gender or ethnicity. Where a difference can be linked to a protected characteristic,
public authorities are required to set equality objectives to address the causes of such differences. Finally, Scottish
public organizations with 20 or more employees were required to publish information on the gender pay gap since
2012.
6When excluding the bottom and top 1 percent, the mean bonus gap stands at 23.22 in 2017/18 and 23.76 in the
second year.
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proportion increases by around 1 percent over the two years. Finally, figure 1 also shows that the
mean gender hourly pay gap is larger in firms that have a lower share of women at the top of the
wage distribution. From now on, we will refer to these data as the GEO data.
Three other features of this policy are important to understand in the UK context. First, the
policy does not impose sanctions on firms that do not improve their gender pay gap over time.
However, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the enforcement body responsible for
this regulation, can issue court orders and unlimited fines for firms that do not comply with the
regulations that mandate the disclosure of pay gaps. As of 2020, all firms were deemed to have
complied. Figure 2 reports the distribution of submission dates for the two years the mandate has
been in place. While some firms do not meet the deadline, the majority publish their data in the
last month before deadline.
Second, this policy is likely to represent an information shock both inside and outside the firm.
According to a survey addressed on behalf of GEO, out of 855 private and non-profit firms with at
least 150 employees, only one third of firms have ever computed their gender pay gap, and just 3
percent have made these figures publicly available. Moreover, up to 13 percent declared that staff
are discouraged from talking about it and 3 percent reported that their contracts include a clause
on pay secrecy (Downing et al. 2015).
Finally, this policy is salient. Not only are the figures publicly available on a government
website, but, as noted in the introduction, they also receive extensive media attention each year
that they are published. Importantly, figure 3 shows that google searches for the term gender pay
gap also spike around each year’s deadline, indicating that this policy has attracted significant
public interest.
3 Identification strategy
To identify the impact of the 2017 transparency policy on wages, occupational outcomes and firm-
level outcomes, we exploit the variation across firm size and over time in its implementation.
Specifically, we estimate a difference-in-difference model that compares the evolution of the out-
comes of interest in firms whose size is slightly larger (treated group) or smaller (control) than the
250-employee cutoff. As firm size can be endogenously determined, we define treatment status
based on firm size in 2015, prior to the start of the consultation process to implement the man-
date. To enhance comparability between treatment and control group, in the main specification
we consider firms with +/ − 50 employees from the 250 threshold.7 When studying employees’
outcomes, our baseline regression model is as follows:
Yijt = αj + θt + β0TreatedF irmj ∗ Postt +X ′itpi + Z ′jtδ + uijt (1)
where i is an employee working in firm j, having 200-300 employees, in year t, with t running
between 2012 and 2019.8 The outcome Yijt is either a measure of occupation held, job mobility,
pay (hourly or weekly wages, bonuses or allowances), or hours worked. As for the regressors, αj
7In the next section, we show that our results are robust both to the use of a different year to define the treatment
status, and to the bandwidth chosen to construct the estimation sample.
8As explained in section 4, we choose this time window because it is the maximum number of years over which
we observe all outcomes of interest.
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are firm fixed effects that capture the impact of firm-specific time-invariant characteristics such as
industry, or firm culture.9 θt are year fixed effects that control for time shocks common to all firms
such as electoral cycles. TreatedF irmj is a dummy equal to one if a firm has at least 250 em-
ployees in 2015, and Postt is a dummy equal to one from 2017 onward. The vector Xit includes
individual controls. In regressions analyzing how the policy affects the composition of firms’
workforces, individual controls are limited to age and age squared. When considering wages, we
control for individual fixed effects to take into account compositional effects. In what follows,
we also compare the results of specifications where the vector Zjt contains different time-varying
firm-level controls, such as region-specific time shocks, industry linear trends, or measures of
product-market concentration, such as interaction terms between the 2011 industry-level Herfind-
ahlHirschman index and year fixed effects. Our main coefficient of interest is β0 which, conditional
on the validity of this identification strategy, should capture any deviation from a parallel evolution
in the outcome of interest between the treatment and the control group due to the introduction of
the mandate. All regressions are weighted with UK Labor Force Survey weights, though in the
appendix we show that our results do not depend on this choice. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level, though in the appendix we also present specifications with other clustering groups
such as firm size, or firm size times industry.
As our hypothesis is that this policy will affect men and women differently, we will estimate
this regression separately by gender. All regression tables will also report the p-value of the t-test
on the equality of coefficients for men and women.
4 Data
To study the overall effect of this government mandate on the outcomes of interest, we make use
of several sources of data, including individual-level data on pay and occupational outcomes, firm-
level data on job vacancies and stock prices. Here we first introduce the data used to measure
employees’ outcomes. This is the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), an employer
survey covering 1 percent of the UK workforce, conducted every year, and designed to be rep-
resentative of the employee population.10 The ASHE sample is drawn from National Insurance
records for working individuals, and their respective employers are required by law to complete
the survey. Specifically, ASHE asks employers to report data on wages, paid hours of work, tenure
in the firm, and pensions arrangements for the selected employees, all of which are measured in
April. Other variables relating to age, occupation and industrial classification, and firm size are
also available. Once workers enter the survey, they are followed even when changing employer,
though individuals are not observed when unemployed or out of the labor force. In practice, ASHE
is an unbalanced panel data set at the employee level.
From ASHE, we create the following variables. First, to measure occupational outcomes and
worker flows, we proceed as follows. We construct a dummy equal to one if a worker is employed
in an occupation whose median wage is in the top two quartiles of the pre-policy wage distribution
(2012-2016). This includes skilled-trades, administrative, technical, and professional and manage-
9Both industry and firm culture can change over time, for instance if firms become multi-product, or hire a new
CEO. Yet, it seems plausible to assume that these characteristics will be constant over the period of time considered.
10Office for National Statistics. (2019). Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 1997-2018: Secure Access. [data
collection]. 14th Edition. UK Data Service. SN: 6689, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6689-13.
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rial occupations. For brevity, we refer to this as “working in above-median-wage occupations”. We
create a dummy variable that is equal to one if the worker has changed job in the last year (ASHE
provides a categorical variable to measure this). We also use months of tenure in the firm, though
this is missing for around 3 percent of the estimation sample. And, finally, we construct a dummy
variable that is equal to one if the employees leaves the firm in t+1. By construction, this variable
is missing in the last year of data.
As for pay measures, the main variable of interest is log real hourly pay, including bonuses and
allowances, but excluding overtime pay; however, we also consider log basic real hourly wage,
bonuses and allowances separately. To study the impact of the policy on bonuses and allowances,
we use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to account for the fact that many workers do
not receive any bonus or allowance. Finally, we consider log real weekly pay, and weekly hours
worked, distinguishing between contractual hours and overtime.
In the empirical analysis, we use data over the period 2012-2019. We chose this time window
for two reasons. First, data on firm job advertisements that we use in the analysis of mechanisms
are only available from 2012 onward. Second, the ONS’ occupational classification changes in
2010, and the variables that follow the new classification are only available from 2012 onward in
the employee data set. However, as soon as new waves of ASHE become available, we will add
them to the estimation period.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the main outcomes, measured in the pre-treatment
period. Several things are worth noting. First, the profile of workers in treated and control firms
is remarkably similar. Second, focusing on the treatment group (columns 1 and 3), there is a six
percent gender gap in the probability of working in above-median-wage occupations. Next, the
unconditional percentage hourly pay gap amounts to 18 percent. There is also a large gender gap
both in the probability of receiving allowances or bonuses (35 and 33 percent respectively), and a
huge one in the amount received (around 60 and 75 percent). Men are also more likely to work
in the private sector than women - though this share is already 80 percent. Finally, it is worth
noticing that among both men and women, only one third of workers is covered by a collective
agreement. This figure is important to consider when thinking about the mechanisms through
which the policy may affect wage and occupational outcomes. In principle, pay transparency may
induce women, especially those covered by collective agreements, to put pressure on employers to
obtain promotions or wage increases. Yet, with such a low share of women covered, it is unlikely
that this channel will be important in triggering firms’ responses.
5 Main findings
This section illustrates our key findings. First, we present the results on occupational outcomes
and job mobility, then we move to the analysis of wages, considering both different pay measures
and various components of wages.
5.1 Occupational outcomes and job mobility
Figure 4 introduces the analysis on occupational outcomes. In particular, it shows the trends in
the variable “above-median-wage occupation” over the period 2012-2019 for employees working
in treated firms (250 to 300 employees) and in control firms (200 to 249 employees). The top
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graph reports the trends for men, while the bottom one refers to women. We can observe two
things from these figures. First, the evolution of this variable in the pre-policy period seems to be
comparable across treatment and control groups, both for male and female employees. Second,
while the top graph suggests that the male occupational distribution has not been affected by the
policy, the bottom graph suggests that treated firms may have changed the composition of their
female workforce after the introduction of the policy, namely by increasing the share of women in
above-median-wage occupations.
Table 3 turns to the regression analysis. Panel A reports the estimates of β0 for men, while Panel
B focuses on women, and each column refers to a different specification. Column 1 reports the
estimates of the baseline specification, which controls for firm and year fixed effects. According
to these results, the mandate increases the probability that women work in above-median-wage
occupations by 3 percentage points - or 5 percent relative to the pre-policy mean reported at the
bottom of the table. In contrast, the policy does not seem to affect the occupational distribution
of men. Column 2 adds individual controls for age and age squared, but the results change little.
Column 3 further includes year times region fixed effects to control for local labor market time
shocks, and once again the results are little affected.11 Columns 4 to 6 add different industry/firm-
level controls. Specifically, column 4 includes industry linear time trends, column 5 includes
interaction terms between the 2011 industry-level Herfindahl-Hirschman index for product market
concentration interacted with year fixed effects, and column 6 includes interaction terms between
firm 2011 output level and year fixed effects. None of these controls affect the estimates of β0 for
either men or women. Thus, as the results are very similar across specifications, in what follows
we take the specification of column 3 as our benchmark specification.12
Table 4 complements these results by analyzing the impact on job mobility. Specifically, the
first column reports the impact on the probability of working in above-median-wage occupations,
column 2 displays the impact on the probability of having joined the firm in the last year, column
3 focuses on months of tenure in the firm, and column 4 reports the effects on the probability
of leaving the firm in t + 1. The results in columns 2 and 3 suggest that the positive impact on
women’s occupational outcomes comes from the newly hired women. Column 4 shows instead
that the policy has no effect on the probability of leaving the firm for either men or women.
As the policy does not affect men’s occupational outcomes or job mobility, the first implication
of this table is that the overall gender composition should have changed in treated firms following
this policy. While we cannot test this implication with the current available data, we will be able to
do so upon gaining access to the Workplace Employment Relationship Survey for the years 2011
and 2018. This will allow us to measure the share of women in treated and control firms both
before and after the introduction of pay transparency legislation.
The second implication of these results is that pay transparency does not seem to affect reten-
tion rates in this context. Yet, as suggested by the “fair wage-effort hypothesis” (Akerlof and Yellen
1990), it will be important to continue monitoring this outcome as the publication of the gender
pay gap indicators, coupled with firms’ responses, may affect effort levels and retention rates of
those workers who perceive that they are being treated unfairly by their employer. Moreover, upon
11We consider NUTS2 regions here, corresponding to 8 areas in the UK.
12In appendix, table A1, we further show that this result seems to be driven by a increase in womens’ probability of
working in occupations in the middle tercile, administrative and skilled trade occupations, and by a contemporaneous
decrease in their likelihood of working in low-paid occupations, namely personal, sales, elementary, and plant and
machine-operative occupations.
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getting access to the Annual Business Survey, we will also study the impact of this policy on labor
productivity.
5.2 Wages
Figure 5 shows the raw trends in the variable “log real hourly pay” over the period 2012-2019
for employees working in treated firms (250 to 300 employees) and in control ones (200 to 249
employees). As above, the top graph reports the trends for men, while the bottom one refers to
women. Two things may be observed from these figures. First, the evolution of real hourly pay in
the pre-policy period seems to be comparable across treatment and control groups, both for male
and female employees. Second, the top graph suggests that male real hourly pay of employees
working in treated firms may have dropped after the introduction of the mandate. As for women,
it does not appear that the policy has visibly affected their real wages.
Table 5 reports the estimates of the difference-in-difference model for this outcome. Panel A
reports the estimates of β0 for men, while Panel B focuses on women. Each column refers to a
different specification. Column 1 presents the estimates from the baseline specification, with firm,
year and individual fixed effects. According to these results, the transparency policy decreases
men’s real hourly pay by around 2 percent in treated firms relative to control ones after the in-
troduction of the mandate, with this effect being significant at 5 percent. In contrast, the policy
does not seem to have an effect on female real wages. Column 2 adds firm times individual fixed
effects. As results are practically unchanged, this indicates that the drop in men’s real wages is
actually a within-firm-within-individual effect, meaning that it is experienced by individuals who
were already employed at the firm before the introduction of the mandate. Column 3 adds year
times region fixed effects to the baseline specification. Point estimates slightly increase but the sig-
nificance level does not change. Next, as above, columns 4 to 6 add different industry/firm-level
controls to the specification of column 3, but the main conclusions of the analysis are unchanged:
pay transparency leads to pay compression from above. Importantly, as indicated by the p-value
of the t-test on the equality of coefficients for men and women, the effects by gender are statisti-
cally different. In other words, this policy leads to a significant reduction of the gender pay gap,
amounting to around 15 percent of the pre-policy mean.13
Tables 6 and 7 further unpack the effects on male hourly wages. First, table 6 shows that
weekly wages, rather than hours worked, are the margin of adjustment. Second, table 7 shows that
the changes brought by the policy are mainly due to contractual wages rather than allowances and
bonuses. Taken together, these results suggest that the slowdown of male real hourly wages may
be explained by a decrease in the probability of being promoted, though the data we have do not
allow us to measure this precisely as it does not include job level information (only occupational
information).
The last point that we will make in this section concerns the effect on women’s pay. In light
of the results on occupational outcomes, we might have expected to see an increase in women’s
wages. Two factors may explain why this effect has not materialized. First, both treated and control
firms might have decided to raise women’s wages if they are competing for the same workers.
13According to the estimates shown in table 5, the transparency policy reduces male real hourly wages by 2.8
percent relative to a pre-treatment mean of 16.92, that is 47 cents. The row pre-policy gender hourly pay gap amounts
to 3.03 pounds. Thus, the policy leads to a reduction of 0.47/3.03 or 15.5 percent.
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Yet, in figure 5, we do not see any sharp increase in women’s wages after the introduction of
pay transparency in either the treatment or the control group. An alternative explanation may
have to do with compositional effects. As treated firms are hiring more women in above-median-
wage occupations relative to the control group, the average woman in a treated firm becomes less
experienced than in the control group. We believe that this is a very likely explanation for why we
fail to see an increase in women’s wages.
6 Robustness checks
The validity of our identification strategy depends on three assumptions. First, it has to satisfy the
parallel-trend assumption, that is the evolution of the outcomes of interest is comparable in treated
and control firms prior to the introduction of the policy. Second, our estimates do not capture the
effect of other time shocks coinciding with the introduction of pay transparency and affecting firms
on the two sides of the 250-employees cutoff differently. Third, the results do not depend on the
size of the bandwidth considered around the policy cutoff, nor do they depend on the year chosen
to define the treatment status.
Parallel-trend assumption. To support the validity of the parallel-trend assumption, we perform
event-study exercises. Specifically we augment regression 1 with the leads and lags of the mandate,
as follows:
Yijt = αj + θt +
2019∑
k=2012
βk(TreatedF irmj ∗ θk) +X ′itpi + Z ′jtδ + uijt. (2)
Figures 6 and 7 report the estimates of the βk on the probability of working in above-median-
wage occupations, and log real hourly pay. In each figure, the top graph refers to men, while
the bottom one refers to women. Note that 2017 is taken as the reference year. The leads of the
mandate are insignificant for both variables, and genders, which strongly supports the hypothesis
that the evolution of the outcomes of interest is comparable across treated and control firms before
the introduction of the mandate. On the other hand, the effect on women’s probability of working
in above-median-wage occupations is visible already in the first post-mandate year and increases
in the second year. As for the negative effect on male hourly pay, this becomes clearly visible and
significant in the second year of the treatment period.
In the appendix, tables A2 and A3 also show that our estimates change little when progressively
restricting the pre-treatment period, which further supports the hypothesis that we are not capturing
the impact of differential pre-trends between treated and control group.
Contemporaneous shocks. To make sure that our estimates do not capture the effect of other
phenomena occurring at the same time as the introduction of pay transparency requirements and
affecting treated and control firms differently, we perform three robustness checks. First, table 8
compares the estimates from the difference-in-difference model to those of the following triple-
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difference model with the gender dimension as the third difference:
Yijt =αj + θt + β0TreatedF irm ∗ Postjt
+ Femi ∗ (γ0 + γ1TreatedF irmj + γ2Postt + γ3TreatedF irm ∗ Postjt)
+X ′itpi + Z
′
jtδ + uijt (3)
where Femi is a dummy variable that is equal to one if i is a woman, and all other variables are
defined as in regression 1. As such, this alternative specification controls for within-group time
shocks that are common to male and female employees. Table 8 reads as follows. The first three
columns refer to the outcome “working in above-median-wage occupations”, while columns 4-
6 focus on log real hourly pay. For each outcome, the first column reports the estimates of the
difference-in-difference model for men, the second columns the effects on women, while the third
one reports the estimates from the triple-difference model. At the bottom of columns 3 and 6,
we also report the p-value on the t-test for the overall effect on women, i.e. the sum of the male
coefficients plus the differential effect on women. The estimates from the triple difference model
are practically indistinguishable from those of the difference-in-difference model, both in the case
of the occupational outcomes and wages. The only difference is that in column 6, the coefficient
on the differential effect of the policy on men and women’s wages is marginally insignificant. Yet,
the overall effect on women is null and insignificant.
We next perform a second robustness check to support the hypothesis that our estimates do not
capture the effect of other time shocks coinciding with the introduction of pay transparency and
affecting differently firms on the two sides of the 250-employees cutoff. Table 9 compares the
results of the difference-in-difference model with that of the following difference-in-discontinuity
model:
Yijt = αj +X
′
itpi
+ Postt ∗ [δ0 + δreg + δ1 ∗ FirmSizej2015 + TreatedF irmj ∗ (β0 + β1 ∗ FirmSizej2015)]
+ uijt (4)
where δreg are regional fixed effects and FirmSizej2015 is a continuous variable measuring the
number of employees in firm j in 2015. The main difference between our main specification and
this one is that the difference-in-discontinuity model takes into account the possibility that firms
with a different number of employees are on different trends (Grembi et al. 2016). Though our
event studies seem to exclude that this is the case, this exercise should further support this assump-
tion. Table 9 reads as follows. Panel A compares the estimates of the different models for men,
while Panel B focuses on women. In each panel, the first three columns refer to the occupational
outcome, while the last three refer to log real hourly wages. For each outcome and gender, the first
column reports the estimates of the impact of the transparency policy from the double-difference
model, while the second column presents those of the difference-in-discontinuity. While coef-
ficients are significant only at 10 percent in this specification, the point estimates for both the
occupational outcome and wages are very little affected.
Finally, we run a series of placebo tests pretending that the mandate binds at different firm size
thresholds. Figures 8 and 9 present the estimates of these placebo policies, together with 95 percent
confidence intervals. The placebo cutoff is indicated in correspondence of the estimates. The
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highlighted estimate represents the one estimated at the actual policy cutoff. In each regression,
the estimation sample includes firms with +/ − 50 employees from the threshold considered.
Reassuringly, the “150” placebo mandate does not appear to have an impact on either male or
female outcomes. This should further exclude the possibility that we are capturing the impact of
time shocks happening at the same time as the mandate and that affect larger firms differently to
smaller firms. As for larger placebo cutoff values, it should be noted that these regressions include
all treated firms. The fact that the magnitude of the effects are non-zero may simply point to
heterogeneous effects of the policy across firm size, consistent with the idea that larger firms are
more exposed to public scrutiny.
Specification. Our third and final set of robustness checks aims to verify that our results are
robust to the choice of the bandwidth around the 250 cutoff, and do not depend on the fact that
we defined the treatment status based on firms’ number of employees in 2015. Figures 10 and 11
show how the estimates of β0 from equation 1 change when restricting or enlarging the bandwidth
around the 250 cutoff. As above, the top graph in each figure refers to men, while the bottom one
refers to women. The x-axis reports the estimated coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals,
while the y-axis reports the bandwidth considered, from +/−30 to +/−80 employees around the
policy cutoff. The estimates on the bandwidth of 50 correspond to the main specification. Figure
10 shows that the effects on women’s probability of working in above-median-wage occupations
is especially stable for bandwidths comprised between 30 and 60, while it vanishes for larger
samples, possibly due to decreased comparability across treatment and control groups. Figure
11 shows instead that the estimated coefficients on men’s real hourly pay are very similar across
specifications, and only become marginally insignificant when estimating the model using the
smallest sample. Conversely, estimates of the coefficient of interest on women’s hourly pay are
always close to zero and insignificant.
Finally, table 10 compares the results when we change the year used to define the treatment
status. The table reads as follows. Panel A refers to men, and panel B to women. In each panel,
columns 1-4 refers to the outcome “working on above-median-wage occupations”, while columns
5-8 concern the outcome log real hourly pay. For each outcome, the first column reports the
results from the main specification. The following columns present the estimates obtained when
defining the treatment status based on firms’ number of employees in the year indicated on top of
the column, 2012, 2013, or 2014. While the estimates that are significant in the main specification
become marginally insignificant for one year, they are significant and similar in magnitude for all
the other years.14
To sum up, our estimates are remarkably stable across different specifications and sample sizes,
which should strongly support the validity of our identification strategy.15
14In the appendix, table A4, we further compare our identification strategy to one where the treatment status was
defined based on actual firm size. While, if anything, we might have expected the coefficients to be larger when using
the actual firm size due to potential positive selection, the point estimates are lower in magnitude and not statistically
significant. The fact that treatment status changes over time using this definition could potentially induce noise in the
estimates, in addition to any selection issue.
15In tables A5 and A6, we further show that our results do not depend on the use of LFS weights, nor are they
sensitive to age restrictions. Finally, in tables A7 and A8 in the appendix we show that the significance of our estimates
is not affected by the clustering group considered, whether this be by firm, firm-size or firm-size times industry.
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7 Mechanisms: firms’ hiring strategies
To delve into the mechanisms driving the estimated effects, and, in particular, in order to under-
stand how treated firms may have been able to attract more women, we analyze their hiring strate-
gies in three dimensions: the effect of the policy on wage posting decisions, the use of gendered
wording, and the offer of flexible working arrangements. Here, we present preliminary results on
the first two dimensions.
To conduct this analysis, we use Burning Glass Technologies (BGT) job-advertisement data
for the period 2012-2019. The data are around 40 million (de-duplicated) individual job vacancies.
They are collected from a wide range of online job listing sites and include a rich set of information.
First, each observation includes the text of the job advertisement. Second, more than 95 percent
of vacancies have an occupational SOC identifier and a county identifier. Around one third of
vacancies, or 13 million observations, include the name of the employer.
One concern with the dataset is the potential for selection issues related to the presence of
the firm name. To guard against this, we compared the occupational distribution of the stock of
vacancies in BGT to employment in the Labor Force Survey (LFS hereafter) for the same period.
Figure C1 in the appendix shows that the two match well, mitigating the greatest potential concern
regarding the representativity of BGT.
We merge the BGT data with the GEO data, using a cosine similarity name-matching algorithm
for the company names, and retain only firms that have an exact match, representing around 50
percent of the entire sample - section C.1 of the appendix provides a detailed description of the
matching algorithm.16 In what follows, we present the key dimensions we explore in this matched
data set.
Wage posting. Many studies document that there is a gender gap in bargaining skills. In partic-
ular, women are less likely to ask for wage increases (Bowles et al. 2007, Babcock et al. 2003),
and tend to avoid bargaining in jobs that leave wage negotiation ambiguous (Leibbrandt and List
2015). In BGT job vacancies, only around 30 percent of job listings contain information on wages
that can be automatically identified, with large heterogeneity across industries, as shown in figure
12. Moreover, as shown in table 11, consistent with the studies cited above, on average GEO firms
that are less likely to post wages also tend to have a higher gender pay gap and a lower share of
women at the top of the wage distribution. This descriptive evidence suggests that wage posting
may be an important dimension of adjustment for firms willing to attract more women.
Gendered wording. A recent strand of psychology and management lab experiments study the
importance of implicit biases in job postings (Tang et al. 2017, Gaucher et al. 2011). In particular,
Gaucher et al. (2011) construct a list of job-listing-specific male and female-oriented terms making
use of implicit association tests. Table B1 in appendix, section B, shows the resulting dictionaries
of terms, w, associated to each gender. The dictionaries are DM and DF for terms that favor men
or women respectively, and map terms according to D : W → {0, 1} depending on whether the
term appears in the list in table B1 or not. Using these dictionaries, we are able to classify each job
16Note that the analysis done in this section is restricted to GEO companies that have a registration number in the
GEO data, as this information is essential to further match them with FAME (see below). This omits around 1000
companies per year.
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advertisement based on a gender score defined as follows:
GenderedScore =
1
|w|
(∑
w
Dmale(w)−
∑
w
Dfemale(w)
)
where w runs over all distinct terms in each job advertisement. A job description that gives a
positive score is considered to have a male-oriented wording, with the magnitude of the score
weighted by the total length of the job description. Importantly, Gaucher et al. (2011) present
lab-based evidence that women are less willing to apply to a job if its posting uses male-oriented
wording. Graph 13 shows the resulting distribution of the score measured in 1000 of words. The
observations for the bottom and top 1 percent of the score have also been removed to increase the
readability of the graph. While the score is centered at 0, the graph shows that there is substantial
variability across job listings in their gendered orientation.
Next, in table 12, we analyze the raw correlations between job listings’ gender score and the
published gender pay gap indicators. Column 1 shows that there is a positive correlation between
firms’ mean gendered score and the reported gender pay gap. In other words, firms that employ
more male-orientated words for their job advertisements also have a larger gender pay gap. In
addition, column 2 shows that a higher gender score is also associated with a lower share of women
in the top quartile of the firm wage distribution.
Regression analysis. Overall, this descriptive evidence suggests that firms’ performance on gen-
der pay gap indicators may be correlated with their hiring strategies, so we now study the causal
impact of the pay transparency policy on firms’ wage posting decisions and choice of job adver-
tisement wording.
In order to do this, we need two additional elements. First, we need a control group, and,
second, we need to know the exact firm size to perform the difference-in-difference analysis. To
construct the final sample, we use FAME, the UK version of Amadeus, covering all UK-registered
firms. For around 30 percent of them, we have information on the number of employees for at least
one year in the pre-treatment period - crucial information to implement the difference-in-difference
analysis. We then merge FAME with GEO firms using Company House registration numbers.
Finally, we restrict the sample to FAME firms with 150 to 249 employees in the years 2014-
2017, and merge the FAME firms that are not in GEO with BG directly using the same name-
matching algorithm for the company name. The final data set contains 1,529,893 observations on
8046 firms. When we further restrict the sample to firms with 200 to 300 employees, which is
going to be the main estimation sample, we end up with 91366 observations and 2109 firms.
To investigate the effect of the pay transparency policy on firms’ wage posting decisions and
choice of wording in job listings, we estimate the following difference-in-difference model at the
vacancy level:
Yijt = αj + θt + Z
′
ijtδ + β0TreatedF irmj ∗ Postt + uijt (5)
where Yjt is either a dummy equal to one if vacancy i for job listing i of firm j in year t contains
wage information, or it represents the gendered score; αj and θt are, firm and year fixed effects,
respectively; and Zijt contains 2-digit occupation fixed effects and occupation-specific time ef-
fects. Finally, standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and we also weight regressions by
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occupation-employment shares from the LFS.
Tables 13 and 14 present the preliminary results of this analysis. The first table refers to wage
posting, while the second shows the results for the gender score. In light of the variation we have
seen in descriptive analysis (especially by industry) in both tables, we explore potential heteroge-
neous effects across different industries. In particular, in table 13, we present the results for the
entire sample, column 1, and for industries with a low or high gender pay gap in the pre-treatment
period.17 While the coefficient is marginally insignificant, the point estimates in column one sug-
gest that treated firms may have be posting wages more frequently following the introduction of
the policy. Interestingly, in the next two columns, we can see that there are indeed heterogeneous
results across industries, and firms in industries with a high gender pay gap pre-treatment become
more likely to post wages after the pay transparency policy is introduced. As for the gender score,
table 14 also points to potential heterogeneous effects across industries. In particular, while in the
entire sample it does not seem that the policy has influenced this margin of decision, in column
3 we can see that firms belonging to industries characterized by a high gendered score in the pre-
treatment period may have decreased the use of male wording following the introduction of the
pay transparency policy, though the coefficient is just marginally insignificant.
Overall, this preliminary analysis suggests that treated firms may have been able to attract
more women in better-paid occupations by changing their hiring strategies. Our next step will
be to further investigate this channel, by exploring the composition of the gendered score, and
studying the offer of flexible work arrangements.
8 Stock market reaction
The public disclosure of firms’ gender pay gap may induce businesses to tackle gender pay differ-
entials to preserve their reputation. The spike in google searches for the topic “gender pay gap”
in correspondence to the deadlines for the publication of gender pay gap indicators suggests that
firms are under the scrutiny of the general audience. But what may matter more to them is what
investors think. A negative reaction of the stock market to the publication of the gender pay gap
figures may constitute a strong incentive for a firm to improve its performance on gender equality.
This paragraph aims to measure this response of the stock market, using the traditional event-study
methodology (Bell and Machin 2018, Lee and Mas 2012). We focus on the first year of publication
as this is when gender pay gap indicators are more likely to represent an information shock for the
market. We first combine the list of firms publishing gender pay gap figures in the financial year
2017/18 with FAME to identify both firms that are directly publicly listed on the London Stock
Exchange (LSE), and those that have a parent company that is publicly listed. This leads us to
identify 926 firms, or around 10 percent of firms publishing gender pay gap figures. Of this group,
101 are directly publicly listed, while the rest has a publicly listed parent company. Importantly,
firms can have the same parent company. As a result, we follow 405 distinct publicly listed firms,
or 35 percent of all firms listed on the main market of the London Stock Exchange in 2018. Also
note that 80 percent of firms belonging to the same group publish on the same date. Hence, in what
follows, we consider the publication date of the first that publishes. Extracting daily stock prices
17To define the two groups, we calculated the mean gender pay gap in each 1-digit industry from ASHE, and defined
as high-GPG firms those with a gender pay gap above the median one. These include manufacturing, construction,
banking and finance, and public administration, education and health sector.
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from Datastream, we then construct firms’ abnormal returns, or AR, as the difference between a
stocks actual return and the expected return, where this is estimated using a simple market model:
ARjt = rjt − (αj + β̂jrmt) (6)
where rjt is firm j stock market return on day t, and rmt is the return of the LSE-all-shares index
on day t. Figure 14 shows the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns, CARS(-1, d, 1) in the five days
before and after the publication date. While these are not statistically different to zero in the days
prior to the publication date, they start to become negative from the publication date up to four days
afterwards, with an average loss per day of around 35 basis points.18 Table 15 further investigates
whether this drop may be related to the performance on the gender pay indicators. Column one
regresses the 3-days CARs on the day of the publication on a constant, the average gender pay gap
reported by firms related to the same publicly listed firm, called “Group-avg GPG” in the table, a
dummy equal to one if the gender pay gap is in favor of men, called “Group-avg GPG positive”,
and an interaction term between these two. Column 2 adds the following controls: a categorical
variable for whether the listed firm directly publishes the GPG indicators, or has a subsidiary
publishing them; and the number of firms in the group publishing the GPG indicators. Column 3
adds industry fixed effects, and column 4 also controls for the log of market capitalization at t-1,
the book-to-market value at t-1 and the return on assets at t-1. While it does not seem that firms
publishing a gender pay gap in favor of men are penalized more than others, the main message of
this analysis is that firms publishing gender pay gap indicators are under the scrutiny of investors.
In turn, this suggests that the reputation motive may have played an important role in explaining
the reaction of treated firms.
9 Conclusion
To tackle the persistence of the glass ceiling phenomenon, many governments are promoting pay
transparency policies. Exploiting the variation across firm size and over time in the application
of the UK transparency policy, this paper shows that this mandate has increased the probability
that women work in above-median-wage occupations by 5 percent, an effect driven by newly hired
women. While this compositional effect has not yet translated into an increase in women’s wages,
this may start to materialize as women are promoted to more senior positions. In addition, the UK
pay transparency law has led to a 2 percent decrease in male real hourly wages in treated firms
relative to control firms. Finally, by combining the difference-in-difference strategy with a text
analysis of job listings, we find suggestive evidence that treated firms belonging to industries with
a high gender pay gap become more likely to post wage information after the gender pay gap policy
was introduced.
Our findings have two main implications. First, pay transparency leads to pay compression
from above. This conclusion is in line with the findings of other studies on pay transparency. In
particular, Mas (2017) finds that pay transparency in the public sector in California leads to a 7
percent reduction in managers’ compensation, while both Baker et al. (2019) and Bennedsen et
18As a comparison, note that Bell and Machin (2018) find that the sudden increase in the minimum wage, an-
nounced by the UK government in May 2015, leads to a 70 basis points immediate decrease in abnormal returns of
low-wage firms.
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al. (2019) find that disclosing employees’ pay by gender leads to a reduction of the gender pay
gap through a negative effect on male real wages. It could be that freezing the wage increases of
better-paid employees is the most viable option for firms to reduce their gender pay gaps in the
short-run.
The second implication of our findings is that by making the glass ceiling visible, pay trans-
parency creates cracks in it. The pre-policy 4 percentage-point gender gap in the probability of
working in above-median-wage occupations is more than halved with the disclosure of gender pay
gap indicators. On top of this, the 2.8 percent negative effect of transparency on men’s real wages
corresponds to approximately a 15 percent decrease in the in-sample pre-policy gender pay gap.
As a comparison, Bertrand et al. (2019) find that female board quotas, another firm policy that
has been largely discussed recently, has no impact on the gender pay gap. In other words, pay
transparency seems to be more effective than other policies in cracking the glass ceiling.
In sum, it is important to stress that our analysis identifies short-term effects, and it is necessary
to keep monitoring the effects of this policy in the long run to fully understand its effect on the labor
market. In particular, pay transparency may be effective only in the short run, when the novelty
of transparency can trigger strong attention from the media, the stock market, and the general
public. Yet, as the UK government is currently discussing to extend this policy to the disclosure of
ethnicity pay gap indicators, our findings offer robust data-based evidence of the potential impact
of such an extension (BEIS 2018).
Our next step is to further explore the impact of the pay transparency policy on firms’ hiring
strategies. In particular, we will study how it affects offers of flexible working arrangements in job
postings. Analyzing this dimension of firms’ decisions seems especially important in light of the
compositional effect that we find on women’s occupational distribution.
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10 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Gender pay gap and women at the top
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Source: UK Government Equalities Office (GEO).
Note: This figure shows the correlation between firms’ gender mean hourly pay gap and the share of women in the
top-quartile of the firm wage distribution. The top graph refers to the 2017/18 data (10,558 observations), while the
bottom one refers to 2018/19 (10,812 observations). The bottom and top 1 percent of the data are excluded from the
sample.
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Figure 2: Distribution submission date by year
0
.02
.04
.06
.08
01
-2
01
8
02
-2
01
8
03
-2
01
8
05
-0
4-
20
18
-D
ea
dli
ne
05
-2
01
8
06
-2
01
8
2017-2018
 
0
.02
.04
.06
.08
.1
01
-2
01
9
02
-2
01
9
03
-2
01
9
05
-0
4-
20
19
-D
ea
dli
ne
05
-2
01
9
06
-2
01
9
2018-2019
 
Source: UK Government Equalities Office (GEO).
Note: This figure shows the distribution of days when firms published their gender pay gap indicators. The top graph
refers to the 2017/18 data (10,558 observations), while the bottom one refers to 2018/19 (10,812 observations). Around
5 percent of firms publish before January of the deadline year.
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Figure 3: GPG searches on Google
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Source: Google Searches.
Note: This figure reports google searches for the term “gender pay gap” between April 2015 and June 2019. The data
are normalized at 100 on April 5 2018.
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Figure 4: Raw trends: working in an above-median-wage occupation
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Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Note: This figure reports the trends in the share of employees working in occupations paid above the median wage.
The top graph refers to men, the bottom one to women. The blue line represents the treatment group, individuals
working in firms with 200-249 employees, and the red line the control group, individuals working in firms with 250-
300 employees.
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Figure 5: Raw trends: log real hourly pay
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Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Note: This figure reports the trends in log real hourly wages. The top graph refers to men, the bottom one to women.
The blue line represents the treatment group, individuals working in firms with 200-249 employees, and the red line
the control group, individuals working in firms with 250-300 employees.
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Figure 6: Event studies - working in above-median wage occupation
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Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Note: This figure reports the estimates of the leads and lags of the policy obtained from regression 2 on the outcome
“working in an above-median-wage occupation”. The top graph refers to men, while the bottom one refers to women.
In the top (bottom) graph, the estimation sample includes men (women) employed in firms with 200-300 employees,
and present in ASHE between the financial years 2011/2012 and 2018/2019. All regressions are estimated using
LFS weights. 95 percent confidence intervals are also reported. The dash vertical line indicates the month when the
mandate is approved, i.e. February 2017.
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Figure 7: Event studies - log real hourly pay
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Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Note: This figure reports the estimates of the leads and lags of the policy obtained from regression 2 on the outcome log
real hourly wage. The top graph refers to men, while the bottom one refers to women. In the top (bottom) graph, the
estimation sample includes men (women) employed in firms with 200-300 employees, and present in ASHE between
the financial years 2011/2012 and 2018/2019. All regressions are estimated using LFS weights. 95 percent confidence
intervals are also reported. The dash vertical line indicates the month when the mandate is approved, i.e. February
2017.
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Figure 8: Placebo cutoffs - above-median-wage occupation
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Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Note: This figure presents the estimated effects of placebo policies on the probability of working in occupations paid
above the median wage. The placebo cutoff is indicated in correspondence of the estimates. The highlighted estimates
represent the actual estimated effect of the policy from regression 1. In each regression, the estimation sample includes
firms with +/−50 employees from the threshold considered. The top graph refers to men, while the bottom one refers
to women. All regressions are estimated using LFS weights. 95 percent confidence intervals are also reported.
29
Figure 9: Placebo cutoffs - log real hourly pay
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Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Note: This figure presents the estimated effects of placebo policies on log real hourly pay. The placebo cutoff is
indicated in correspondence of the estimates. The highlighted estimates represent the actual estimated effect of the
policy from regression 1. In each regression, the estimation sample includes firms with +/ − 50 employees from
the threshold considered. The top graph refers to men, while the bottom one refers to women. All regressions are
estimated using LFS weights. 95 percent confidence intervals are also reported.
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Figure 10: Varying bandwidth - working in above-median wage occupation
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Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Note: This figure shows how the estimates of β0 from regression 1 change when restricting or enlarging the bandwidth
around the 250 cutoff. The outcome considered is the probability of working in occupations paid above the median
wage. The top graph refers to men, while the bottom one refers to women. The x-axis reports the estimated coefficients
with 95 percent confidence intervals, while the y-axis reports the bandwidth considered, from +/ − 30 to +/ − 80
employees around the policy cutoff. The estimates on the bandwidth of 50 correspond to the main specification. All
regressions are estimated using LFS weights. 95 percent confidence intervals are also reported.
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Figure 11: Varying bandwidth - log real hourly pay
30
40
50
60
70
80
B
an
dw
id
th
 
-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
 
Estimated Beta0
Men
 
30
40
50
60
70
80
B
an
dw
id
th
 
-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
 
Estimated Beta0
Women
 
Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Note: This figure shows how the estimates of β0 from regression 1 change when restricting or enlarging the bandwidth
around the 250 cutoff. The outcome considered is log real hourly wage. The top graph refers to men, while the bottom
one refers to women. The x-axis reports the estimated coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals, while the
y-axis reports the bandwidth considered, from +/− 30 to +/− 80 employees around the policy cutoff. The estimates
on the bandwidth of 50 correspond to the main specification. All regressions are estimated using LFS weights. 95
percent confidence intervals are also reported.
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Figure 12: Wage posting by occupation and industry
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Source: BGT 2012-1019.
Note: These graphs present the occupational and industry distribution of job listing wage posting.
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Figure 13: Gendered score
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Source: BGT 2012-1019.
Note: This figure presents the sample distribution of the gendered score of the job listings. The bottom and top 1
percent values have been excluded from the graph.
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Figure 14: Cumulative abnormal returns around publication date - 2017 -2018
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Source: Datastream, FAME, GEO.
Note: This figure plots 3-day cumulative abnormal returns around the publication date of gender pay gap indicators in
2017-2018. In particular, it shows CARS(-1, 1) around the day reported on the graph. 95 percent confidence intervals
are also included. The sample includes firms that had to publish gender pay gap indicators by April 5th 2018, or that
have a subsidiary that have to publish these figures.
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Table 1: GPG public indicators
2017-18 2018-19 Change (%)
(1) (2) (3)
Mean gender hourly pay gap 14.34 14.19 -0.01
(14.91) (14.21)
Median gender hourly pay gap 11.79 11.88 0.01
(15.84) (15.51)
Mean gender bonus gap 7.67 15.44 1.01
(833.02) (200.70)
Median gender bonus gap -21.71 -0.86 -0.96
(1,398.97) (270.51)
Share men receiving bonus 35.39 35.72 0.01
(36.33) (36.68)
Share women receiving bonus 33.93 34.40 0.01
(36.02) (36.38)
% women lower quartile 53.67 53.88 0.00
(24.13) (24.11)
% women lower-middle quartile 49.49 49.82 0.01
(26.09) (26.19)
% women upper-middle quartile 45.14 45.62 0.01
(26.22) (26.32)
% women top quartile 39.20 39.75 0.01
(24.41) (24.48)
Observations 10,558 10,812
Source: UK Government Equality Office (GEO).
Notes: This table reports mean values of the indicators published by
the firms targeted by the mandate, separately by year. Standard errors
reported in parentheses.
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Table 2: ASHE Summary statistics - pre-mandate period
Treated men Control men Treated women Control women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Highly-paid occupation 0.69 0.70 0.65 0.64
(0.46) (0.46) (0.48 (0.48
Bottom tercile 0.19 0.18 0.32 0.33
(0.39) (0.39) (0.47) (0.47)
Middle tercile 0.32 0.32 0.21 0.24
(0.47) (0.47) (0.41) (0.42)
Top tercile 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.43
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Changed job since last year 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.22
(0.39) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41)
Tenure in months 86.83 88.01 72.62 72.10
(96.70) (98.11) (78.86) (80.72)
Leaving the firm in t+1 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.10
(0.31) (0.31) (0.29) (0.30)
Hourly pay 16.92 16.71 13.89 13.88
(14.83) (12.38) (9.15) (10.64)
Weekly pay 618.00 610.86 432.55 430.39
(551.95) (456.36) (318.64) (329.67)
Receiving allowances 0.23 0.22 0.15 0.14
(0.42) (0.42) (0.36) (0.34)
Allowance amount 18.26 17.06 6.96 7.29
(70.23) (57.28) (26.55) (37.01)
Allowance amount (per hour) 0.49 0.46 0.23 0.23
(1.88) (1.59) (0.88) (1.12)
Receiving bonus pay 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.05
(0.28) (0.30) (0.23) (0.23)
Bonus amount 9.10 11.27 3.48 3.16
(78.46) (104.69) (29.55) (27.4)2
Bonus amount (per hour) 0.23 0.30 0.12 0.09
(1.91) (2.87) (1.81) (0.77)
Weekly hours 36.51 36.71 30.86 30.76
(8.14) (7.95) (10.35) (10.52)
Overtime hours 1.51 1.50 0.55 0.50
(4.23) (4.03) (2.24) (2.09)
Full-time 0.90 0.91 0.67 0.67
(0.29) (0.29) (0.47) (0.47)
Private sector 0.90 0.91 0.79 0.77
(0.30) (0.29) (0.41) (0.42)
Covered by collective agreement 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.34
(0.45) (0.45) (0.47) (0.47)
Observations 8,350 9,859 6,988 8,706
Source: ASHE, 2012-2016
Notes: This table reports the mean of the main variables used in the analysis separately for men and
women, and treatment and control group, before the implementation of the mandate. Standard errors
reported in parentheses.
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Table 3: Impact on above-median-wage occupations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Men
Treated Firm*Post -0.00404 -0.00374 -0.00340 -0.00335 -0.00328 -0.00449
(0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0124)
Observations 24658 24658 24658 24658 24658 22722
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69
Panel B: Women
Treated Firm*Post 0.0289∗∗ 0.0313∗∗ 0.0309∗∗ 0.0308∗∗ 0.0311∗∗ 0.0320∗∗
(0.0142) (0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0149)
Observations 21484 21484 21484 21484 21484 18610
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
Individual controls X X X X X
Year*Region FE X X X X
Region FE X X X X
Product Market Concentration X
Industry Trends X
Firm Output X
P-value Men Vs Women 0.072 0.053 0.056 0.057 0.057 0.057
Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Notes: This table reports the impact of pay transparency on the probability of working in an occu-
pation above the median wage, obtained from the estimation of regression 1. The estimation sample
comprises individuals working in firms that have between 200 and 300 employees. Panel A presents
results for men, Panel B for women. Each column refers to a different specification, as specified at
the bottom of the table. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. The post dummy is equal
to one from 2018 onward. A treated firm is defined as having at least 250 employees in 2015. All re-
gressions are weighted with LFS weights. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm
level in parentheses. The pre-treatment mean represents the mean of the outcome variables for the
treated group between 2012 and 2017. The p-value at the bottom of the table refers to the t-test on the
equality of coefficients for men and women (reported in panel A and B).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Impact on job mobility
Above-median-wage Changed job Tenure Leaving the firm
occupation since last year in months in t+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Men
Treated Firm*Post -0.00340 0.0181 -0.990 0.0216
(0.0118) (0.0149) (2.698) (0.0240)
Observations 24658 24658 23986 21539
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.690 0.18 86.83 0.11
Panel B: Women
Treated Firm*Post 0.0309∗∗ 0.0438∗∗∗ -7.786∗∗∗ 0.0162
(0.0138) (0.0157) (2.393) (0.0230)
Observations 21484 21484 20847 18652
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.65 0.21 76.620 0.09
P-value Men Vs Women 0.056 0.224 0.056 0.865
Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Notes: This table reports the impact of pay transparency on various occupational outcomes, ob-
tained from the estimation of regression 1. The estimation sample comprises individuals working
in firms that have between 200 and 300 employees. Panel A presents results for men, Panel B for
women. Each column refers to a different outcomes, as specified in the title of the columns. All
regressions include firm, year, region, year-region specific fixed effects and individual controls
for age and age squared. A treated firm is defined as having at least 250 employees in 2015. The
post dummy is equal to one from 2018 onward. All regressions are weighted with LFS weights.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm level in parentheses. The pre-treatment
mean represents the mean of the outcome variables for the treated group between 2012 and 2017.
The p-value at the bottom of the table refers to the t-test on the equality of coefficients for men
and women (reported in panel A and B).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Impact on log real hourly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Men
Treated Firm*Post -0.0260∗∗ -0.0259∗∗∗ -0.0277∗∗ -0.0281∗∗ -0.0274∗∗ -0.0281∗∗
(0.0114) (0.00944) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0118)
Observations 24658 24658 24658 24658 24658 22722
Pre-Treatment Mean 16.92 16.92 16.92 16.92 16.92 16.92
Panel B: Women
Treated Firm*Post 0.00139 0.00138 0.00243 0.00322 0.00261 0.000440
(0.0143) (0.0118) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0147)
Observations 21484 21484 21484 21484 21484 18610
Pre-Treatment Mean 13.89 13.89 13.89 13.89 13.89 13.89
Individual FE X X X X X
Firm* Individual FE X
Year*Region FE X X X X
Region FE X X X X
Product Market Concentration X
Industry Trends X
Firm Output X
P-value Men Vs Women 0.116 0.006 0.082 0.070 0.083 0.113
Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Notes: This table reports the impact of pay transparency on log real hourly pay, obtained from the estimation
of regression 1. The estimation sample comprises individuals working in firms that have between 200 and
300 employees. Panel A presents results for men, Panel B for women. Each column refers to a different
specification, as specified at the bottom of the table. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. The
post dummy is equal to one from 2018 onward. A treated firm is defined as having at least 250 employees in
2015. All regressions are weighted with LFS weights. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered
at firm level in parentheses.The pre-treatment mean represents the mean of the outcome variables for the
treated group between 2012 and 2017. The p-value at the bottom of the table refers to the t-test on the
equality of coefficients for men and women (reported in panel A and B).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Impact on different pay measures
Log real hourly pay Log real weekly pay Weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Men
Treated Firm*Post -0.0277∗∗ -0.0217∗ 0.128
(0.0111) (0.0127) (0.226)
Observations 24658 24658 24658
Pre-Treatment Mean 17.92 618.00 36.51
Panel B: Women
Treated Firm*Post 0.00243 -0.00571 -0.311
(0.0143) (0.0188) (0.398)
Observations 21484 21484 21484
Pre-Treatment Mean 13.89 432.55 30.86
P-value Men Vs Women 0.078 0.480 0.321
Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Notes: This table reports the impact of pay transparency on various wage measures, obtained
from the estimation of regression 1. The estimation sample comprises individuals working in
firms that have between 200 and 300 employees. Panel A presents results for men, Panel B for
women. Each column refers to a different outcomes, as specified in the title of the columns.
All regressions include year, firm, region, year-region specific and individual fixed effects. The
post dummy is equal to one from 2018 onward. A treated firm is defined as having at least 250
employees in 2015. All regressions are weighted with LFS weights. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors clustered at firm level in parentheses.The pre-treatment mean represents the
mean of the real hourly pay, the real weekly pay and the weekly hours for the treated group
between 2012 and 2017. The p-value at the bottom of the table refers to the t-test on the
equality of coefficients for men and women (reported in panel A and B).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Impact on log real hourly pay - different pay components
Log real Log real Allowances Incentive pay
hourly pay hourly basic pay (per hour) (per hour)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Men
Treated Firm*Post -0.0277∗∗ -0.0257∗∗ -0.0329 -0.00306
(0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0249) (0.0196)
Observations 24658 24658 24658 24658
Pre-Treatment Mean 16.92 16.6 0.49 0.23
Panel B: Women
Treated Firm*Post 0.00243 0.00709 -0.0140 -0.0286
(0.0143) (0.0137) (0.0256) (0.0196)
Observations 21484 21484 21484 21484
Pre-Treatment Mean 13.89 13.29 0.23 0.12
P-value Men Vs Women 0.082 0.052 0.588 0.359
Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Notes: This table reports the impact of pay transparency on various wage measures, ob-
tained from the estimation of regression 1. The estimation sample comprises individuals
working in firms that have between 200 and 300 employees. Panel A presents results
for men, Panel B for women. Each column refers to a different outcomes, as specified
in the title of the columns. All regressions include year, firm, region, year-region spe-
cific and individual fixed effects. The post dummy is equal to one from 2018 onward.
A treated firm is defined as having at least 250 employees in 2015. All regressions are
weighted with LFS weights. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm
level in parentheses. The pre-treatment mean represents the mean of the real hourly
wages, the real hourly basic pay, the real hourly allowances and real hourly incentives
for the treated group between 2012 and 2017. The p-value at the bottom of the table
refers to the t-test on the equality of coefficients for men and women (reported in panel
A and B).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Diff-in-Diff vs Triple Diff-in-Diff
Above-median-wage Log real hourly pay
occupation
Men Women Triple Diff Men Women Triple Diff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated Firm*Post -0.00340 0.0309∗∗ -0.00814 -0.0277∗∗ 0.00243 -0.0255∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0138) (0.0125) (0.0111) (0.0143) (0.0114)
Treated Firm*Post*Female 0.0399∗∗ 0.0264
(0.0194) (0.0174)
Post*Female -0.0285∗∗ -0.0191
(0.0120) (0.0117)
Treated Firm*Female -0.0951 -0.131
(0.0136) (0.119)
Observations 24658 21484 46142 24658 21484 46142
P-value Women 0.031 0.953
Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Notes: Columns 1 to 3 report the impact of pay transparency on the probability of working in an
occupation above the wage median. Columns 4 to 6 report the impact of pay transparency on log
real hourly pay. The estimation sample comprises individuals working in firms that have between
200 and 300 employees. All regressions control for firm and year fixed effects. Columns 1 to 3 also
include age and age squared. Columns 4 to 6 also include individual fixed effects. A treated firm is
defined as having at least 250 employees in 2015. All regressions are weighted with LFS weights.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm level in parentheses. The pre-treatment
mean represents the mean of the real hourly pay for the treated group between 2012 and 2017. The
p-value at the bottom of the table refers to the t-test on the effect for women in the triple difference-in-
difference regression (Treated Firm*Post+Treated Firm*Post*Female) .
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9: Diff-in-Diff vs Diff-in-Disc
Above-median-wage Log real hourly pay
occupation
Diff-in-Diff Diff-in-Disc Diff-in-Diff Diff-in-Disc
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Men
Treated Firm*Post -0.00340 -0.00299 -0.0277∗∗ -0.0278∗
(0.0118) (0.0147) (0.0111) (0.0148)
Observations 24658 24658 24658 24658
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.69 0.69 16.92 16.92
Panel B: Women
Treated Firm*Post 0.0309∗∗ 0.0303∗ 0.00243 -0.00915
(0.0138) (0.0167) (0.0143) (0.0176)
Observations 21484 21484 21484 21484
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.65 0.65 13.89 13.89
Year FE X X
Year*Region FE X X
Post X X
Post*Region FE X X
Norm. Firm Size*Post X X
Norm. Firm Size*Treated Firm*Post X X
Individual controls X X X X
P-value Men Vs Women 0.056 0.127 0.0823 0.399
Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Notes: Columns 1 and 2report the impact of pay transparency on the probability of working in
an occupation above the wage median. Columns 3 and 4 report the impact of pay transparency
on log real hourly pay. The estimation sample comprises individuals working in firms that have
between 200 and 300 employees. Panel A presents results for men, Panel B for women. All
regressions include firm fixed effects. In columns 1 and 2, the individual controls comprise age
and age squared. In columns 3 and 4, the individual controls include individual fixed effects. A
treated firm is defined as having at least 250 employees in 2015. All regressions are weighted
with LFS weights. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm level in parenthe-
ses. The pre-treatment mean represents the mean of the real hourly pay for the treated group
between 2012 and 2017. The p-value at the bottom of the table refers to the t-test on the equality
of coefficients for men and women (reported in panel A and B).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
44
Table 10: Changing year to define treatment status
Above-median-wage Log real hourly pay
occupation
2015 2014 2013 2012 2015 2014 2013 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Men
Treated Firm*Post -0.00340 -0.00973 -0.00273 -0.00273 -0.0277∗∗ -0.0163 -0.0199∗ -0.0369∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0135) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0120)
Observations 24658 24586 24476 24239 24658 24586 24476 24239
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.69 16.92 16.80 17.01 17.09
Panel B: Women
Treated Firm*Post 0.0309∗∗ 0.0501∗∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗ 0.0235 0.00243 -0.00770 -0.00518 -0.00777
(0.0138) (0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0152) (0.0143) (0.0154) (0.0150) (0.0149)
Observations 21484 21310 21097 20746 21484 21310 21097 20746
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 13.89 13.90 13.92 13.77
Individual controls X X X X X X X X
Year*Region FE X X X X X X X X
P-value Men Vs Women 0.06 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.63
Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Notes: This table compares the impact of pay transparency on the main outcomes, when the treatment status is defined
using different pre-policy years. The first four columns refer to the outcome “Working in above-median wage occupations”,
while the last four columns present the results for the outcome log real hourly pay. For each outcome, the column name
indicates the year used to define treatment status. Panel A presents results for men, Panel B for women. In all regressions,
the estimation sample comprises individuals working in firms that have between 200 and 300 employees. All regressions
include firm and year times region fixed effects. Individual controls include age and age squared in columns 1-4, and
individual fixed effects in columns 5-8. The post dummy is equal to one from 2018 onward. A treated firm is defined as
having at least 250 employees in the year indicated on top of the column. All regressions are weighted with LFS weights.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm level in parentheses.The pre-treatment mean represents the mean
of the outcome variables for the treated group between 2012 and 2017. The p-value at the bottom of the table refers to the
t-test on the equality of coefficients for men and women (reported in panel A and B).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 11: Raw correlation wage posting and gender pay gap indicators
Mean Gender Share of women
Pay Gap at the top
(1) (2)
Panel A: 2017-2018
Wage Posted -0.0824∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(0.00767) (0.0123)
Observations 4671 4671
Panel B: 2018-2019
Wage Posted -0.0789∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.00709) (0.0124)
Observations 4660 4660
Source: GEO, BGT 2012-2019.
Notes: This table shows the raw correlation between
GEO firms wage posting decisions and their gender pay
gap indicators. Panel A refers to the publication year
2017-2018, while Panel B refers to the publication year
2018-2019. In each panel, the sample includes the GEO
firms that have been matched with BGT entries with
a name-matching score of at least 0.8. Wage posted
represents the share of a firm’s vacancies that contain
wage information over the period 2012-2019.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 12: Raw correlation gendered score and gender pay gap indicators
Mean Share of women
Gender pay gap at the top
(1) (2)
Panel A: 2017-2018
Gendered Score 0.0884∗∗∗ -1.281∗∗∗
(0.0301) (0.0449)
(0.0301) (0.0449)
Observations 4671 4671
Panel B: 2018-2019
Gendered Score 0.0528∗ -1.286∗∗∗
(0.0275) (0.0444)
Observations 4660 4660
Source: GEO, BGT 2012-2019.
Notes: This table shows the raw correlation between GEO
firms gendered score and their gender pay gap indicators.
Panel A refers to the publication year 2017-2018, while
Panel B refers to the publication year 2018-2019. In each
panel, the sample includes the GEO firms that have been
matched with BGT entries with a name-matching score
of at least 0.8. The gendered score represents the average
gendered score per company between 2012-2019.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 13: Impact on wage posting
Entire sample Low-gpg High-gpg
(1) (2) (3)
Treated Firm*Post 0.0410 -0.0222 0.0968∗∗
(0.0357) (0.0429) (0.0439)
Observations 91366 36401 54943
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.330 0.290 0.350
Source: BGT, GEO, FAME 2012-2019.
Notes: This table reports the impact of pay transparency on
firms’ wage posting decisions, obtained from the estimation
of regression 5. The estimation sample comprises firms that
have between 200 and 300 employees. All regressions in-
clude year, firm, occupation, and occupation times year fixed
effects. The post dummy is equal to one from 2018 onward.
A treated firm is defined as having at least 250 employees in
the pre-treatment period. High-gpg industries are those with
a gender pay gap above the across-industry median in the pre-
treatment period. These include manufacturing, construction,
banking and finance, and public administration, education
and health sectors. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
clustered at firm level in parentheses.The pre-treatment mean
represents the mean of the outcome variable for the treated
group between 2012 and 2017.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 14: Impact on gendered score
Entire sample Low High
(1) (2) (3)
Treated Firm*Post -0.000141 0.0864 -0.168
(0.0736) (0.0957) (0.116)
Observations 91366 54591 36758
Pre-Treatment Mean -0.0600 -0.230 0.170
Source: BGT, GEO, FAME 2012-2019.
Notes: This table reports the impact of pay transparency
on firms’ wording in job listings, obtained from the es-
timation of regression 5. The estimation sample com-
prises firms that have between 200 and 300 employees.
All regressions include year, firm, occupation, and occu-
pation times year fixed effects. The post dummy is equal
to one from 2018 onward. A treated firm is defined as
having at least 250 employees in the pre-treatment pe-
riod. High-score industries include agriculture, forestry
and fishing, manufacturing, transport and communication,
and distributive sectors. Heteroskedasticity-robust stan-
dard errors clustered at firm level in parentheses.The pre-
treatment mean represents the mean of the outcome vari-
able for the treated group between 2012 and 2017.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 15: CARs(-1,1) around publication
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Group-avg GPG positive 0.657 0.608 0.682 0.596
(0.653) (0.694) (0.723) (0.723)
Group-avg GPG -0.0944∗∗∗ -0.0913∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.0305) (0.0314) (0.0346) (0.0355)
Group-avg GPG.*group-avg perf. positive 0.105∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.0338) (0.0352) (0.0391) (0.0383)
Constant -1.198∗∗ 2.072∗∗∗ 2.619∗∗∗ 0.112
(0.587) (0.652) (0.825) (1.565)
Observations 405 405 405 383
Ownership structure X X X
No. Firms in the group X X X
Industry FE X X
Other controls X
Source: Datastream, FAME, GEO.
Notes: This table shows the estimates of the cumulative abnormal returns around the publica-
tion of gender pay gap indicators. The dependent variable is the sum of abnormal returns in
a 3-days window around the publication date. The sample includes firms that have to publish
gender pay gap indicators by April 5th 2018, or that have a subsidiary that have to publish
these figures. From column 2 onward, we include a variable measuring the number of firms
in the group publishing the GPG indicators, and dummies for whether the listed firm has to
publish the gender pay gap indicators, or it is the immediate, domestic or global owner of a
firm that has to publish them. Other controls in column 4 include the lagged values of log of
market capitalization, price to book value ratios, and the return on assets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix
A-1
A Robustness checks on ASHE analysis
Table A1: Impact on occupations in each wage tercile
Top Middle Bottom
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Men
Treated Firm*Post 0.00787 -0.00979 0.00192
(0.0137) (0.0131) (0.0104)
Observations 24658 24658 24658
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.49 0.32 0.19
Panel B: Women
Treated Firm*Post -0.0206 0.0456∗∗∗ -0.0251∗
(0.0155) (0.0139) (0.0138)
Observations 21484 21484 21484
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.46 0.21 0.32
Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Notes: This table reports the impact of pay transparency
on occupations in each wage tercile, obtained from the
estimation of regression 1. The estimation sample com-
prises individuals working in firms that have between
200 and 300 employees. Panel A presents results for
men, Panel B for women. Each column refers to a dif-
ferent outcomes, as specified in the title of the columns.
All regressions include year, firm, region, year-region
specific and individual controls for age and age squared.
A treated firm is defined as having at least 250 employ-
ees in 2015. The post dummy is equal to one from
2018 onward. All regressions are weighted with LFS
weights. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clus-
tered at firm level in parentheses. The pre-treatment
mean represents the mean of the outcome variables for
the treated group between 2012 and 2017.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A2: Impact on above-median-wage occupations - restricting pre-period
Main From From
specification 2013 2014
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Men
Treated firm*post -0.00340 -0.00634 -0.00770
(0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0113)
Observations 24658 21954 19018
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.69 0.69 0.70
Panel B: Women
Treated firm*post 0.0309∗∗ 0.0339∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0137)
Observations 21484 19248 16896
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.65 0.65 0.65
Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Notes: This table reports the impact of pay transparency on
the probability of working in an above-median-wage occu-
pation, obtained from the estimation of regression 1. The
estimation sample comprises individuals working in firms
that have between 200 and 300 employees. Panel A presents
results for men, Panel B for women. The first column re-
ports the main estimates, while in the following ones, the
pre-treatment period is progressively restricted. All regres-
sions include firm, year, region, year-region specific fixed
effects and individual controls for age and age squared. A
treated firm is defined as having at least 250 employees in
2015. The post dummy is equal to one from 2018 onward.
All regressions are weighted with LFS weights.
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Table A3: Impact on log real hourly wage - restricting pre-period
Main From From
specification 2013 2014
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Men
Treated firm*post -0.0277∗∗ -0.0277∗∗ -0.0265∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0107)
Observations 24658 21954 19018
Pre-Treatment Mean 16.92 17.06 17.12
Panel B: Women
Treated firm*post 0.00243 0.00382 0.00452
(0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0145)
Observations 21484 19248 16896
Pre-Treatment Mean 13.89 13.91 14.03
Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Notes: This table reports the impact of pay transparency on
log real hourly wages, obtained from the estimation of regres-
sion 1. The estimation sample comprises individuals working
in firms that have between 200 and 300 employees. Panel A
presents results for men, Panel B for women. The first col-
umn reports the main estimates, while in the following ones,
the pre-treatment period is progressively restricted. All re-
gressions include year, firm, region, year-region specific and
individual fixed effects. A treated firm is defined as having
at least 250 employees in 2015. The post dummy is equal
to one from 2018 onward. All regressions are weighted with
LFS weights.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4: Treatment status based on past vs actual firm-size
Above-median-wage Log real hourly pay
occupation
Main specification Actual Main specification Actual
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Men
Treated Firm*Post -0.00340 -0.0159 -0.0277∗∗ -0.00235
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0111) (0.0114)
Observations 24658 25256 24658 25256
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.69 0.68 16.92 16.84
Panel B: Women
Treated Firm*Post 0.0309∗∗ 0.0149 0.0126 -0.00617
(0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0143) (0.0151)
Observations 21484 22111 21484 22111
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.65 0.64 13.89 13.93
Individual controls X X X X
Year*Region FE X X X X
Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Notes: This table compares the results of our specifications with those we would ob-
tained if treatment status was based on actual firm size. The first two columns re-
fer to the outcome “Working in above-median wage occupations”, while the last two
columns present the results for the outcome log real hourly pay. For each outcome, the
column name indicates the year used to define treatment status. Panel A presents re-
sults for men, Panel B for women. In all regressions, the estimation sample comprises
individuals working in firms that have between 200 and 300 employees. All regres-
sions include firm and year times region fixed effects. Individual controls include age
and age squared in columns 1-2, and individual fixed effects in columns 3-4. The post
dummy is equal to one from 2018 onward. In column 1, a treated firm is defined as
having at least 250 employees if it is above this threshold in 2015, while in the sec-
ond column a firm is treated whenever it has at least 250 employees. All regressions
are weighted with LFS weights. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at
firm level in parentheses. The pre-treatment mean represents the mean of the outcome
variables for the treated group between 2012 and 2017. The p-value at the bottom of
the table refers to the t-test on the equality of coefficients for men and women (reported
in panel A and B).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A5: Impact on above-median-wage occupations - changing the estimation sample
Main specification Age 25+ Age 16-65
With Without With Without With Without
LFS weights LFS weights LFS weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Men
Treated Firm*Post -0.00340 -0.00202 -0.00393 -0.00271 -0.00170 0.00161
(0.0118) (0.0129) (0.0121) (0.0133) (0.0121) (0.0132)
Observations 24658 24658 21895 21895 24146 24146
PreTreatmentMean 0.69 0.60 0.71 0.63 0.69 0.61
Panel B: Women
Treated Firm*Post 0.0309∗∗ 0.0313∗∗ 0.0347∗∗ 0.0337∗∗ 0.0266∗ 0.0273∗
(0.0138) (0.0143) (0.0138) (0.0143) (0.0139) (0.0144)
Observations 21484 21484 18922 18922 21116 21116
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.65 0.61 0.69 0.65 0.65 0.61
Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Notes: This table reports the impact of pay transparency on the probability of working in
an occupation above the median wage, obtained from the estimation of regression 1. The
estimation sample comprises individuals working in firms that have between 200 and 300
employees. Panel A presents results for men, Panel B for women. Each column refers to
a different specification, as specified at the top of each column. All regressions include
firm, year, region, year-region specific fixed effects and individual controls for age and age
squared. The post dummy is equal to one from 2018 onward. A treated firm is defined as
having at least 250 employees in 2015. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered
at firm level in parentheses. The pre-treatment mean represents the mean of the outcome
variables for the treated group between 2012 and 2017.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A6: Impact on log hourly wages - changing the estimation sample
Main specification Age 25+ Age 16-65
With Without With Without With Without
LFS weights LFS weights LFS weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Men
Treated Firm*Post -0.0277∗∗ -0.0268∗∗ -0.0202∗ -0.0193∗∗ -0.0267∗∗ -0.0258∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.00984) (0.0112) (0.0105)
Observations 24658 24658 21895 21895 24146 24146
Pre-Treatment Mean 16.92 15.82 17.96 16.74 16.95 15.88
Panel B: Women
Treated Firm*Post 0.00243 0.00243 0.00569 0.00537 -0.000606 -0.000985
(0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0145) (0.0142)
Observations 21484 21484 18922 18922 21116 21116
Pre-Treatment Mean 13.89 13.40 14.70 14.10 13.91 13.43
Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Notes: This table reports the impact of pay transparency on log real hourly wage, obtained
from the estimation of regression 1. The estimation sample comprises individuals working in
firms that have between 200 and 300 employees. Panel A presents results for men, Panel B for
women. Each column refers to a different specification, as specified at the top of each column.
All regressions include firm, year, region, year-region specific fixed effects and individual fixed
effects. The post dummy is equal to one from 2018 onward. A treated firm is defined as having
at least 250 employees in 2015. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm level
in parentheses. The pre-treatment mean represents the mean of the outcome variables for the
treated group between 2012 and 2017.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A7: Impact on above-median-wage occupations - different clustering
S.E. clustered at the level of:
firm firm-size firm-size*
industry
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Men
Treated Firm*Post -0.00340 -0.00340 -0.00340
(0.0118) (0.0106) (0.0105)
Observations 24658 24658 24658
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.660 0.660 0.660
Panel B: Women
Treated Firm*Post 0.0309∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0115) (0.0124)
Observations 21484 21484 21484
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.610 0.610 0.610
Number of clusters 4639 101 655
P-value Men Vs Women 0.0578 0.026 0.035
Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Notes: This table reports the impact of pay transparency on
the probability of working in an above-median-wage occupa-
tion, obtained from the estimation of regression 1. The es-
timation sample comprises individuals working in firms that
have between 200 and 300 employees. Panel A presents re-
sults for men, Panel B for women. Each regressions uses dif-
ferent clustering groups for the standard errors as specified at
the top of each column. All regressions include firm, year, re-
gion, year-region specific fixed effects and individual controls
for age and age squared. A treated firm is defined as having at
least 250 employees in 2015. The post dummy is equal to one
from 2018 onward. All regressions are weighted with LFS
weights.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A8: Impact on log real hourly wages - different clustering
S.E. clustered at the level of:
firm firm-size firm-size*
industry
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Men
Treated Firm*Post -0.0277∗∗ -0.0277∗∗∗ -0.0277∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.00891) (0.00870)
Observations 24658 24658 24658
Pre-Treatment Mean 17.630 17.630 17.630
Panel B: Women
Treated Firm*Post 0.00243 0.00243 0.00243
(0.0143) (0.0114) (0.0107)
Observations 21484 21484 21484
Pre-Treatment Mean 13.850 13.850 13.850
Number of clusters 4639 101 655
P-value Men Vs Women 0.082 0.041 0.028
Source: ASHE, 2012-2019.
Notes: This table reports the impact of pay transparency on log
real hourly wages, obtained from the estimation of regression 1.
The estimation sample comprises individuals working in firms
that have between 200 and 300 employees. Panel A presents
results for men, Panel B for women. Each regressions uses dif-
ferent clustering groups for the standard errors as specified at the
top of each column. All regressions include year, firm, region,
year-region specific and individual fixed effects. A treated firm
is defined as having at least 250 employees in 2015. The post
dummy is equal to one from 2018 onward. All regressions are
weighted with LFS weights.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B Gendered score
Table B1: Words used for the gendered score
Masculine words Feminine words
active decisive affectionate modesty
adventurous determination cheered nag
aggression determined cheerful nurture
aggressive dominant cheers nurtured
aggressiveness dominate cheery nurtures
aggressor domination childlike nurturing
ambitious domineering children pleasantly
ambitiousness forced childrens polite
analysing forceful commitment quietly
analysing greedy committed respond
analysis headstrong committing responsibility
analyst hierarchical communal responsible
analytical hierarchy compassionate responsive
asserting hostile connected responsively
assertive hostility connecting sensitive
asserts impulsive connections sensitivity
athlete individualistic considerate submissive
athletic intellectual cooperating supported
athleticism leader cooperative supporting
autonomous leading dependable supports
autonomy logic depending sympathetic
boasted masculine emotional sympathy
boaster objective empathetic tenderly
boasting opinion empathic togetherness
challenged outspoken empathy trusted
challenger persist feminine trusting
challenging principled flatterable trusts
compete reckless gentle understanding
competence self-reliance honest understands
competent self-reliant interdependence warming
competing self-sufficiency interdependent warmly
competitive self-sufficient interpersonal warms
confident stubborn interpersonal whine
courage superior interpersonally whining
courageous kind yielded
decide kinship yielding
decision loyally yields
decisions loyalty
Source: Based on Gaucher et al. (2011).
Notes: This table presents the words used to construct the gendered
score.
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C Burning Glass Techonologies
Figure C1: Occupational distribution in BGT and LFS
Source: BGT and LFS, 2012-2019.
Note: This figure compares the occupational distribution in the stock of vacancies in BGT and across employed
individuals in the LFS.
A-11
C.1 Name matching algorithm
Due to the large number of job vacancy postings, we used a combination of techniques to match
individual job vacancy postings to firm-level data from FAME or the GEO list directly. We first
collapsed all firm names in each data set down to a unique set of firm names using standard text
cleaning procedures. We identified any exact matches between firm names in postings and our
firm-level data set, giving these a match score of unity. We matched the remaining N firm names
from the vacancy postings with the universe of official firm names, with M unique entries, using a
combination of techniques provided in the scitkit-learn software package. First, the vacancy firm
names are expressed as character-level 2- and 3-grams with a maximum of 8,000 features, creating
a matrix T with dimensions (number of postings) X (number of features). The 8,000 features
define a vector space that we used to express the official firm names in too, with a matrix G.
Matching directly with these matrices would require NXM inner products of 8,000 dimensional
vectors. Instead, we created a reduced vector space of just 10 dimensions using truncated singular
value decomposition on T , creating a reduced dimension matrix Tˆ and expressing G as Gˆ in the
reduced space. The vectors representing Gˆ and Tˆ were then sorted into 500 clusters using k-means,
providing an associated cluster for each firm name on both sides of the matching problem. For each
cluster ci with i ∈ {1, 500} the problem was reduced to finding matches between ci(N) ≤ N and
ci(M) ≤ M entries - where the equality holds for at most one of the clusters respectively (and
rarely holds in practice). Within each cluster, we computed all of the pair-wise cosine similarities
between ci(T ) and ci(G); i.e. within a cluster, and with features indexed by f , the matches for T
are found by solving
argmax
m
{Tnf ·Gfm}
The score is the cosine similarity of the matched vectors scaled by 0.99 (to distinguish exact
matches from exact-in-the-vector-space matches).
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